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Following the 2008 financial market collapse, Congress passed the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, splitting jurisdiction
over OTC swaps between the SEC and the CFTC. Each agency takes a
different approach to regulating the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
OTC swap agreements. Although both approaches designedly protect investors
who mistakenly waive their right to litigation when buying OTC swaps,
neither addresses the economic realities inherent in these transactions.
Consequently, the current scheme overregulates investors, impinges on the
competitiveness of the OTC swap market, and contradicts the policies
underlying Dodd-Frank. This note contends that a limited, prescriptivebased approach should be taken to adequately respond to these concerns.
Moreover, the agencies should look to the ISDA for assistance in facilitating
compliance with these newly enacted rules.
I.	INTRODUCTION: A PLEA FOR ACTION

Wall Street quakes and the financial markets tremble when disgruntled investors
reeling from deals gone bad threaten class action litigation against financial giants
like JPMorgan Chase.1 These resonating fears are not unfounded; class action suits
remain prevalent in banking litigation and are expected to proliferate in the years to
come. 2 Investment firms selling financial products attempt to mitigate seismic
damage by including pre-dispute arbitration clauses in new-client agreements. 3
Following the 2008 market collapse, the practice of using these clauses began
attracting scrutiny and severe criticism by investors and advocacy groups alike, as
investment firms became increasingly aggressive in requiring mandatory arbitration
1.

See Susan Antilla, Schwab Case Casts Spotlight on Securities Arbitration and Its Flaws, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5,
2013, at B5, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/schwab-case-casts-spotlight-onsecurities-arbitration-and-its-flaws/.

2.

See generally Baker Hostetler, 2012 Year-End Review of Class Actions (2013), available at
http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/News/Alerts/Litigation/2013/Class-ActionYear-End-Review.pdf.
Another potential trend to keep an eye on is the development of class action litigation
relating to the [London Interbank Offered Rate] rate-fixing scandal, which has the
potential to impact trillions of dollars of financial transactions worldwide and could be a
catalyst to the accelerated expansion of class and collective action procedures in other
parts of the world.

Id. at 44.
3.

A “pre-dispute arbitration clause” is broadly defined as an agreement between a firm and its client stating
that the parties agree to subject future disagreements to arbitration. Modern financial transaction
agreements use arbitration clauses that include express class action waivers, which prevent the parties from
litigating disputes through a class action. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304
(2013). For ease of analysis, this note’s use of “pre-dispute arbitration clause” includes a clause that waives
class action suits. Similarly, this note’s use of “financial product” refers to any product purchased with the
expectation of earning a favorable return, unless otherwise indicated. For a full discussion of class action
litigation under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see David Marcus, The History of the
Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 587 (2013).
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when negotiating new contracts.4 The “take it or leave it” approach requiring predispute arbitration clauses inflicts potential harm on unsophisticated investors who
cooperatively sign their agreements without fully understanding the repercussions of
inadvertently waiving their right to litigate disputes.5 The core of this issue arises
from the traditional tensions of fairness, efficiency, cost, and neutrality when
comparing arbitration to litigation. 6 Investor advocates condemn mandatory
arbitration as being “unfair, inefficient, expensive, and biased.” 7 These critics argue
that “the selected arbitrators do not have to follow the law, rarely permit depositions
and typically do not award punitive damages.” 8 Firms, of course, support the
arbitration process for the exact opposite reasons, arguing it is more effective,
efficient, fair, and far less expensive.9 Proponents argue that arbitration is faster, and
therefore cheaper, due to its limited motion practice and narrowly tailored discovery.10
Nonetheless, depending on the financial product in question, recent trends indicate
that both sides to a nonexchange-traded transaction prefer to include mandatory
arbitration language in their agreements.11
In response to the criticisms of mandatory arbitration, § 921 of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) granted
rulemaking authority to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
empowering it to restrict the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in broker-dealer
and investment adviser contracts.12 Supporters of litigation remedies (i.e., class
4.

See Antilla, supra note 1.

5.

Id.

6.

Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 Pace L. Rev. 1174, 1179 (2010).

7.

Id.

8.

See Antilla, supra note 1.

9.

Gross, supra note 6.

10.

See generally Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkt. Ass’n, White Paper on Arbitration in the Securities
Industry (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/societies/sifma_compliance_
and_legal_society/whitepaperonarbitration-october2007.pdf.

11.

See International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) discussion infra Part II.C.3.

12.

The provision reads as follows:

SEC. 921 AUTHORITY TO RESTRICT MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE
ARBITRATION.

(a) Amendment to Securities Exchange Act of 1934.—Section 15 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o), as amended by this title, is further
amended by adding at the end of the following new subsection:
“(o) Authority to Restrict Mandatory Pre-dispute Arbitration.—The
Commission, by rule, may prohibit, or impose conditions or limitations on the use of,
agreements that require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or municipal
securities dealer to arbitrate any future dispute between them arising under the Federal
securities laws, the rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules of a self-regulatory
organization if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations
are in the public interest and for the protection of investors.”
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actions) chide the SEC for failing to exercise this power in a timely manner.13 To
address the SEC’s inaction, the Investor Choice Act of 2013 was introduced in
Congress on August 2, 2013.14 If enacted, the bill will prohibit broker-dealers15 from
imposing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements when selling securitiesbased derivatives.
Ironically, regulations governing futures-based exchange-traded derivatives have
prohibited the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses since the early 2000s.16
The National Futures Association (NFA)17 is reluctant to enforce mandatory predispute arbitration agreements due, at least in part, to the practice’s contravention of
“prevailing law and policy regarding dispute resolution procedures.”18 Thus, customers
doing business with firms registered with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
(b) Amendment to Investment Advisers Act of 1940.—Section 205 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-5) is amended by adding at the end
the following new subsection:
....

“(f) Authority to Restrict Mandatory Pre-dispute Arbitration.—The
Commission, by rule, may prohibit, or impose conditions or limitations on the use of,
agreements that require customers or clients of any investment adviser to arbitrate any
future dispute between them arising under the Federal securities laws, the rules and
regulations thereunder, or the rules of a self-regulatory organization if it finds that such
prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are in the public interest and for
the protection of investors.”

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank] (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 7, 12, 15,
and 31). The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), on the other hand, was not
granted such rulemaking authority. See id.
13.

See Antilla, supra note 1.

14.

Investor Choice Act of 2013, H.R. 2998, 113th Cong., available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/113/hr2998/text.

15.

A “broker” is generally defined as “any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others.” Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 3(a)(4)(A), 48 Stat. 881 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2013)). A “dealer” is generally defined as “any person engaged
in the business of buying and selling securities . . . for such person’s own account through a broker or
otherwise.” Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(5)(A) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(A)
(2013)). Most brokers and dealers must register with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).
Exchange Act of 1934 § 15 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o).

16.

See 17 C.F.R. § 166.5(b) (2014); Nat’l Futures Ass’n, Code of Arbitration § 3 [hereinafter Code
of Arbitration], available at https://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/NFAManual.aspx?Section=5; A
New Regulatory Framework for Trading Facilities, Intermediaries and Clearing Organizations, 66 Fed.
Reg. 42256-01 (Aug. 10, 2001).

17.

“[The] National Futures Association (NFA) is the industrywide, self-regulatory organization for the
U.S. derivatives industry. [The] NFA strives every day to safeguard market integrity, protect investors
and help our Members meet their regulatory responsibilities.” Nat’l Futures Ass’n, http://www.nfa.
futures.org (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).

18.

New Regulatory Framework for Trading Facilities, Intermediaries and Clearing Organizations, 66 Fed.
Reg. 42,256 (Aug. 10, 2001); see also Code of Arbitration, supra note 16, § 1; SRO discussion infra
Part II.C.2.
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Commission (CFTC)19 will have different rights available for settling disputes than
customers transacting with SEC registrants.
An added layer of complexity emerges for customers investing in over-thecounter swaps (“OTC swaps”).20 Although Dodd-Frank overhauled the regulatory
landscape for firms dealing in OTC swaps, it did not grant rulemaking authority
over the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in OTC swap transactions. 21
Nonetheless, the 2013 ISDA Arbitration Guide22 (the “Guide”) published on
September 9, 2013 by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA)—a trade organization for OTC swap market participants—provides some
guidance in regulating their use. Unlike U.S.-based OTC swaps, counterparties to
an international OTC swap transaction regularly incorporate pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in their agreements and many of them rely upon the Guide for direction.23
The Guide provides model arbitration clauses to be used in conjunction with standard
form contracts provided to market participants by the ISDA.24 Each of these clauses
includes language mandating that any dispute arising from the transaction shall be
resolved through arbitration.25 However, the Guide carries no authoritative weight in
the United States, 26 leaving the dispute settlement rights associated with U.S.-based
OTC swap transactions murky and unclear.
19.

A “Futures Commission Merchant,” for example, is an individual or organization which both solicits or
accepts orders to buy or sell futures contracts, options on futures, retail off-exchange forex contracts, or
swaps, and accepts money or other assets to support such orders. These entities are typically required to
register with the NFA, the self-regulatory organization (SRO) of the CFTC. Futures Commission
Merchant (FCM), Nat’l Futures Ass’n, http://www.nfa.futures.org/%5C/%5C/NFA-registration/
fcm/index.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).

20. An “over-the-counter swap” (OTC swap) is a bilateral agreement between various counterparties that assume

credit exposure of the instrument. The terms of an OTC swap, including the product’s margining, are
customizable to meet the needs of the contracting parties. Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions,
Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html#3 (last visited Apr. 25, 2015)
[hereinafter ISDA FAQ ]. But see the discussion infra Part II.C.3 regarding new margin requirements for
OTC swaps. In 2012, the OTC swap market was estimated to be worth a total of $708 trillion. Sarah N.
Lynch, U.S. Senate Panel OKs Budget Boosts for SEC, CFTC, Reuters (June 14, 2012, 3:51 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/14/us-senate-cftc-sec-funding-idUSBRE85D1HJ20120614.

21.

See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 722, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§ 2 (2013)).

22.

Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, 2013 ISDA Arbitration Guide (2013) [hereinafter 2013 ISDA
Arbitration Guide], available at http://w w w2.isda.org/attachment/NTg0MQ==/ISDA_
Arbitration_Guide_Final_09.09.13.pdf.

23.

See ISDA discussion infra Part II.C.3.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26. See, e.g., Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, ISDA Outlines Approach on Cross-Border Issues:

Principles Address Inter-jurisdictional Recognition of Derivatives Regulation (Aug. 20,
2013), available at http://www2.isda.org/news/isda-outlines-approach-on-cross-border-issuesprinciples-address-inter-jurisdictional-recognition-of-derivatives-regulation (indicating that ISDA
principles merely serve as a guide to develop “frameworks and processes for inter-jurisdictional
recognition of derivatives regulation”).
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This note discusses the current regime regulating the use of mandatory predispute arbitration clauses in OTC swap transactions governed by the SEC and
CFTC, exposing current flaws in the system. It then demonstrates that a “one size
fits all” approach to regulating the use of these clauses is unworkable and impractical
in the context of OTC swaps. A bright-line rule does not accurately reflect the needs
of each counterparty and fails to address the power distributions inherent in these
transactions. Instead, this note suggests that a balanced prescriptive-based approach
is necessary to adequately protect investors while simultaneously maintaining the
competitiveness of the OTC swap market.
Part II discusses the history leading up to the current use of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in the dealing of complex financial products. It examines the
divergent views taken by the SEC, CFTC, and ISDA in shaping the use and legality
of these clauses. Importantly, Part II demonstrates that these different approaches
have arbitrarily compartmentalized segments of the OTC market without a visibly
rational basis for doing so. Part III focuses on the “fairness” aspect of mandatory
arbitration to exploit the complications associated with the arbitrary jurisdictional
divide between the SEC and CFTC. It applies various theories of negotiating power
to demonstrate that, both economically and pragmatically, a “one size fits all”
approach to regulation is unworkable. Part IV suggests that certain regulations
already enacted under Dodd-Frank’s framework sufficiently protect a large segment
of the OTC swap market. For those market participants excluded from this
protection, Part IV proposes a two-phase approach to standardizing the regulation of
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in the U.S. OTC swap market. Cooperation among
the SEC, CFTC, and ISDA to implement this approach will, in turn, further the
various policies upon which Dodd-Frank is based.
II.	HISTORY: TRACING AN EMERGING CONFLICT

A. Overview of Derivatives Regulation in the United States

Fragmented regulation besets the financial markets in the United States. 27 On
the one hand, securities and options on securities are governed by the SEC. 28 Futures
and options on futures, on the other hand, are regulated by the CFTC. 29 Until
recently, OTC swaps—which comprise such financial products as off-exchange27.

The United States is unlike many other countries because of its dual regulatory regime. The following
markets have only one regulator for their entire financial system: Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Cayman
Islands, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Gibraltar, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Maldives, Malta, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Singapore, South Korea,
Switzerland, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Arab Emirates. See Elizabeth F. Brown, A Comparison of
the Handling of the Financial Crisis in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, 55 Vill. L.
Rev. 509, 512 n.13 (2010). Although much of the discussion following the financial crisis has criticized
the dual regulatory model, none of it has generated movement to change the model employed by the
United States. See id. at 511–12

28. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 722, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)

(2013).

29. Id. § 2(a)(1)(A).
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traded forward contracts, options, and swaps—were highly unregulated. 30
Dodd-Frank addressed unregulated OTC swaps by imposing a divided jurisdiction
over those products between the SEC and CFTC (together the “Commissions”).31
Each agency’s jurisdiction depends on the type of OTC swap transaction in dispute.
The SEC governs security-based swap transactions, 32 and the CFTC oversees all
other OTC swap transactions.33 The Commissions share authority over mixed swap
transactions. 34 Although Dodd-Frank empowers the Commissions with joint
rulemaking authority for mixed swaps, they have yet to exercise their power. 35 One
30. See Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as

amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27(f) (2013)); see also Donald N. Lamson & Hilary Allen, SEC and CFTC
Joint Rulemakings Under Dodd-Frank—A Regulatory Odd Couple?, 43 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 495, 496
(2011), available at http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2011/03/
SEC%20and%20CF TC%20Joint%20Rulemak ings%20Under%20DoddFrank A%20_ _ / Files/
View%20full%20article%20SEC%20and%20CFTC%20Joint%20Rulemakings__/FileAttachment/
AT031011SecuritiesRegulationLawLamsonandAllenPub__.PDF.

Id.

Over time, the increasing size of the swaps markets continued to draw Congressional and
regulatory scrutiny, but Congress confirmed its endorsement of the indirect regulation
model. In 2000, rather than divide jurisdiction over swaps between interested regulators,
the CFMA excluded bilaterally traded swaps between sophisticated parties from
regulatory oversight. The exclusion was based on the belief that most swaps were not
susceptible to manipulation and most swap counterparties were sophisticated participants
who did not require regulatory protection in what functioned as a wholesale market.

31.

Derivatives, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml
(last modified Feb. 12, 2015). The conflicting cultures of the SEC and CFTC heighten the problems
associated with this split in jurisdiction. Both agencies interpret and apply rules differently and are
divergent in their approach to regulating financial products. The SEC tends to employ a more rulesbased approach, while the CFTC uses a principles-based approach. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation 50 (2009).

32.

Generally, swaps are financial products “based on interest or other monetary rates,” whereas securitybased swaps are financial products “based on the yield or value of a single security, loan, or narrowbased security index.” Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap
Agreement”; Mixed-Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 17 Fed. Reg. 48,207, at
48,262 (Aug. 13, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230, 240, and 241 (2014)).

33.

See discussion infra Part III.A.

34. Id.
35.

Although this rulemaking has yet to occur, the CFTC has provided the following explanation:
In order to facilitate the trading of these instruments in appropriate circumstances, the
proposed rules provide that bilateral, uncleared mixed swaps, where one of the counterparties
is dually registered as a dealer or major participant with both the CFTC and also with the
SEC, would be subject to certain key provisions of the [Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)]
and related CFTC rules as well as the requirements of the federal securities laws. For all
other mixed swaps, the Commissions are proposing a process where a person who desires or
intends to list, trade, or clear such a mixed swap (or class thereof) can ask the agencies for a
joint order permitting the requesting person (and any other person or persons that
subsequently lists, trades, or clears that mixed swap) to comply, as to parallel provisions only,
with specified parallel provisions of either the CEA or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“Exchange Act”), and the rules and regulations under the relevant statute, rather than
being required to comply with parallel provisions of both the CEA and the Exchange Act.
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commentator has suggested that the regulatory marinade slowing this financial
reform is due, at least in part, to the battle over the amount of funding that should be
appropriated to these agencies.36 This jurisdictional split has caused uncertainty over
which agency’s rules apply to which financial products. It comes as no surprise that
this uncertainty blooms when SEC and CFTC rules—that could arguably apply to
the same financial product—conflict. This is precisely the problem emerging in the
Commissions’ regulation of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. This nascent clash could
have widespread, adverse repercussions not only for firms transacting in the United
States, but also across the global financial markets.
B. Overview of U.S. Arbitration: The Federal Arbitration Act

Before 1925, a party could enter into a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, and
then decline to honor it once a dispute arose, irrespective of the substance of the
transaction.37 This caused more congestion in the courts and greater litigation costs.
In response, Congress passed the United States Arbitration Act, 38 which later became
known as the Federal Arbitration Act (the “Act”). Among other things, the Act made
arbitration clauses in commercial contracts “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”39 In
essence, the Act was only intended to make voluntary arbitration agreements between
merchants enforceable—not to validate arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts.40
The Act aimed to preempt litigation in favor of a faster, less expensive arbitration
proceeding.41

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Q & A—Final Rules and Interpretations i) Further
Defining “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; ii) Regarding
“Mixed Swaps”; and, iii) Governing Books and Records for “Security-Based Swap Agreements”
4 (2012) [hereinafter CFTC Q&A], available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/
documents/file/fd_qa_final.pdf.
36. Lynch, supra note 20.
37.

Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in a Box, or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, 44
Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 391, 394–95 (2012).

38. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C.

§§ 1–14 (2013)).

39.

Id. § 2 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 2).

40. Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law

Never Enacted by Congress, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 99, 107 (2006).

41.

Catherine Moore, The Effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on Arbitration Agreements: A Proposal for Consumer
Choice, 12 Pepp. Disp. Res. L.J. 503, 506 (2012) (citing Jon O. Shimabukuro, The Federal Arbitration
Act: Background and Recent Developments, CRS Rep. Congress 1 (Aug. 15, 2003)). For recent litigation
involving the Federal Arbitration Act, see Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662,
687 (2010) (holding that parties with a contract silent on the issue of class-wide arbitration “cannot be
compelled to submit their dispute to class arbitration”), and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740, 1756 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a state rule treating class
action waivers in adhesion contracts as unconscionable).
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Until 1953, financial product contracts incorporating pre-dispute arbitration
agreements were regularly enforced.42 Then the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Wilko
v. Swan, that pre-dispute clauses could not be used to compel investors to resolve
their claims through arbitration.43 The Court emphasized that the right to select a
judicial forum cannot be waived, and any such agreement is invalid.44 Comparatively,
Wilko gutted the more f lexible and streamlined approach to resolving disputes
envisioned by the Act’s drafters.
C. Overview of Arbitration in Derivative Transactions
		

1. Securities-Based Exchange-Traded Derivatives

The SEC is marshaled by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),
a self-regulatory organization (SRO).45 In 1973, the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD),46 which is now part of FINRA, adopted the NASD Code of
Arbitration (“the Code”), which governs securities arbitration.47 Section 12 of the
Code prohibits financial firms from compelling clients to arbitrate through predispute agreements.48 Instead, investors may freely choose between arbitration and
litigation in the event of a dispute. Continuing this trend, in 1979 the SEC notified
firms that requiring arbitration without adequate disclosure would violate the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.49 At this point, the judiciary and regulators had
42.

Moore, supra note 41, at 507.

43.

346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). The Court concluded that an agreement to arbitrate is a “stipulation,” and the
right to select this type of forum cannot be waived under § 14 of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 434–35.
Instead, the Court determined that Congress must have intended § 14 “to apply to a waiver of judicial trial
and review.” Id. at 437.

44. Id.
45.

See generally U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm., The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects
Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).

46. “The [National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)] is the leading private sector regulator of

America’s securities industry and operates the largest securities dispute resolution forum in the world,
and handles ninety percent of security industry arbitrations and mediations in the United States.”
Matthew Eisler, Difficult, Duplicative and Wasteful?: The NASD’s Prohibition of Class Action Arbitration
in the Post-Bazzle Era, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1891, 1891 n.2 (2007).

47.

See generally id.; see also Moore, supra note 41, at 508; Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Code of
Arbitration Procedure, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=
2403&element_id=4033&record_id=11676&filtered_tag= (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).

48. Moore, supra note 41, at 508–09. Today, this rule exists as Financial Industry Regulatory Authority

(FINRA) Rule 12200. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Code of Arbitration Procedure for
Customer Disputes, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403&
element_id=4096&record_id=5174&filtered_tag= (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).

49. Moore, supra note 41, at 508 (citing Notice to Broker-Dealers Concerning Clauses in Customer

Agreements Which Provide for Arbitration of Future Disputes, Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, 17
SEC Docket 1167, at *4 (July 2, 1979) (“[I]n 1983 the Exchange Act Rule 15c2-2 was adopted to
address [the inclusion of] pre-dispute arbitration agreements in customer brokerage agreements. These
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seemingly closed the door on mandatory arbitration clauses in securities transactions,
including securities-based exchange-traded derivatives.
It wasn’t until 1987 that the door was reopened. In Shearson/American Express v.
McMahon50 and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,51 the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed Wilko and held that claims arising under both the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and the Securities Act of 193352 are
arbitrable.53 The Court determined that the earlier concerns over the inadequacy of
arbitration to protect investors’ rights, as articulated in Wilko, were no longer relevant
for arbitration proceedings. This was due, at least in part, to the SEC’s interim
changes to the regulatory structure of the securities laws.54 When read together,
these decisions meant that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising under
the securities laws were enforceable.55 As a result, firms could now force consumers
into arbitration by insisting upon pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
In the wake of these decisions, the SEC took the position that banning mandatory
arbitration clauses was, absent express legislation, beyond its power.56 In 2010,
Congress enacted legislation to address the SEC’s position: Section 921 of DoddFrank grants the SEC power to decide how mandatory arbitration claims are resolved
in securities disputes.57 Specifically, the legislation amended both the Exchange Act
and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to allow the SEC “to prohibit or limit the
use of arbitration agreements used by brokers, dealers, or securities traders that arise
under the federal securities laws or the rules of a self-regulatory organization—such
as FINRA—if such conditions are in the public interest and for the protection of
investors.”58
However, the SEC never exercised this rulemaking authority.59 In 2011, a flurry
of criticism was unleashed rebuking the SEC for its failure to act.60 The brokerage
firm Charles Schwab & Company (“Schwab”) triggered the torrent of criticism when
it unilaterally amended its account agreements to include a provision forcing nearly
seven million clients to waive their rights to bring class actions against the firm—an
option that was previously available to even those who had agreed to mandatory premeasures meant that when arbitration agreements were included in a securities agreement, customers
had to be made aware of this fact and potential consequences.”)).
50. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
51.

490 U.S. 477 (1989).

52.

Moore, supra note 41, at 510–11.

53.

Gross, supra note 6, at 1184.

54. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233–34; Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 480–83.
55.

McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238; Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 483–85.

56. Gross, supra note 6, at 1184.
57.

See generally Moore, supra note 41.

58. Id. at 515.
59.

See Antilla, supra note 1.

60. Id.
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dispute arbitration clauses.61 FINRA’s enforcement division filed a disciplinary action
against Schwab shortly thereafter,62 asserting that Schwab’s class action waiver
violated both NASD and FINRA rules.63 After losing “its enforcement action against
Schwab when an in-house hearing panel dismissed the regulator’s claim,” FINRA
appealed to the National Adjudicatory Council.64 Before the appeal was concluded,
FINRA’s Board of Governors reversed the hearing panel decision.65 Then, in April
2014, FINRA won its battle to prohibit Schwab from requiring a class action waiver.66
Still, critics argue that the SEC has largely disregarded Dodd-Frank’s mandate to
decide how mandatory arbitration clauses are to be resolved in securities disputes. In a
letter addressed to SEC Chair Mary Jo White,67 Senator Al Franken wrote: “The time is
ripe for the Commission to act to protect the investing public and prevent further abuse of
forced arbitration contracts.”68 Following this lambasting, House Financial Services
Committee Representative Keith Ellison introduced the Investor Choice Act of 2013,
which seeks to amend § 921 of Dodd-Frank to statutorily “prohibit the use of mandatory
pre-dispute agreements in broker-dealer and investment adviser customer contracts that
restrict investors’ ability to pursue claims in the lawful forum of their choosing.”69 Although
the bill was referred to committee, its chance of becoming law remains slim to this day.70
61.

Finra Charges Charles Schwab & Co. with Violating Finra Rules by Using Class Action Waiver in Customer
Agreements, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/
NewsReleases/2012/P125517.

62. Antilla, supra note 1.
63. See Complaint and Request for Expedited Hearing at 8, Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab &

Co., Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2011029760201, (Feb. 1, 2012),
available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@ad/documents/industry/p125516.
pdf. Charles Schwab & Company (“Schwab”) challenged FINRA’s decision, won at a panel hearing on
February 21, 2013, and FINRA subsequently appealed. Antilla, supra note 1.

64. Matthias Rieker, Finra Wins Appeal in Schwab Class-Action Dispute, Wall St. J. (last updated April 24,

2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303380004579522093469025968.

65.

Id.

66. Id. “Lawyers had said [that] Schwab’s attempt to prevent class-actions could have set a precedent for other

brokers to put similar clauses into their customer agreements, which have the potential to hurt investors
who are less likely to go through costly arbitration over small losses from unsuitable investments.” Id.

67.

Sen. Franken Leads Charge to Protect Consumers’ Legal Rights Against Wall Street, Al Franken U.S. Sen.
for Minn. (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2381.

68. Id.
69. NASAA Strongly Supports the Investor Choice Act of 2013, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n (Aug. 2, 2013),

http://www.nasaa.org/25252/nasaa-strongly-supports-the-investor-choice-act-of-2013/; Investor
Choice Act of 2013, H.R. 2998, 113th Cong. “Similar bills introduced in the Senate in earlier years
have been unsuccessful. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 (S. 1782), reintroduced as The Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009 (S. 931) both died in committee. An earlier House bill, The Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2009 (H.R. 1020), met a similar fate.” Three Years After Dodd Frank, No SEC Action in Sight on
Mandatory Securities Arbitration, PRWeb (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.prweb.com/releases/
InvestorChoiceAct/2013/prweb11081501.htm.

70. See H.R. 2998 (113th): Investor Choice Act of 2013, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/

bills/113/hr2998 (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
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2. Commodities-Based Exchange-Traded Derivatives

Less controversy has surrounded the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses on the commodities side of the industry.71 The CFTC has taken the
unequivocal position that a firm cannot decline to open a futures account if a client
refuses to sign a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.72 In the event that a customer
voluntarily signs such an agreement, however, the CFTC requires that “the agreement
include a notice that the customer agrees to forgo private litigation but will still have
a forty-five-day window in which to elect a reparations proceeding.” 73 Moreover,
institutional customers may enter such agreements and waive the right to bring a
private reparations claim against a firm.74 Although the CFTC—in response to a
directive from Congress—considered whether it should include class actions in the
reparations forum, it ultimately decided against this expansion.75 When compared to
the SEC, the CFTC’s approach is a step in the right direction in that it carves out
greater leeway for institutional customers—who presumably carry more bargaining
power—to waive their right to litigation.76 But as the discussion below suggests, the
CFTC still falls short of the target.
The NFA, the futures industry SRO established under the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA), takes the position that properly executed pre-dispute arbitration agreements
are binding.77 However, a client is not otherwise required to arbitrate.78 To be
enforceable, the pre-dispute arbitration agreement must comply with Commission
Rule 166.5, which requires such agreements to be entered into voluntarily.79
71.

This could be, in part, because arbitration is used less for resolving disputes involving commodity-based
derivatives. See, e.g., Arbitration Statistics, Nat’l Futures Ass’n, https://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaarbitration-mediation/arbitration-statistics.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).

72. See 17 C.F.R. § 166.5(c)(1) (2014).
73. Verity Winship, Public Agencies and Investor Compensation: Examples from the SEC and CFTC, 61

Admin. L. Rev. 137, 149 (2009).

74.

See 7 U.S.C. § 18(g) (2013) (“Nothing in this section prohibits a registered futures commission merchant
from requiring a customer that is an eligible contract participant, as a condition to the commission merchant’s
conducting a transaction for the customer, to enter into an agreement waiving the right to file a claim under
this section.”). Indeed, such a condition precedent subjects the consumer to the same risks that are discussed
throughout this note. These include, among other things, the inability to effectively negotiate for other
provisions in the governing agreement. See power distribution discussion infra Part III.B.

75. Winship, supra note 73, at 150. This decision was issued in response to the agency’s request for

comments “on the appropriateness of class actions in reparations proceedings.” Id. at 150 n.84. Other
expansions have also been rejected “because of the need to keep the program simple.” Id. at 150.

76. See Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) discussion infra Part III.B.
77.

See Code of Arbitration, supra note 16; Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1–27f (2013); see also
Nat’l Futures Ass’n, NFA Arbitration: Customer Arbitration Guide, available at http://www.
nfa.futures.org/nfa-arbitration-mediation/publications/customer-arbitration-guide.pdf (last visited Apr.
25, 2015).

78. The NFA’s mandatory arbitration provisions refer to the firms that are required to arbitrate. Id.
79. Code of Arbitration, supra note 16, § 1; see also 17 C.F.R. § 166.5(b) (2014) (“Voluntariness. The use

by customers of dispute settlement procedures shall be voluntary . . . .”).
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3. OTC Derivatives

The $693 trillion OTC derivatives market80 provides a flexible venue to transact in
customizable contracts for hedging risk and taking positions on future price movements.
The key provisions of Dodd-Frank’s Title VII—including clearing, trading, capital,
margining, reporting, and recordkeeping81—will fundamentally alter the OTC
derivatives market forever. CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler once opined that:
The Wall Street reform bill will—for the first time—bring comprehensive
regulation to the swaps marketplace. Swap dealers will be subject to robust
oversight. Standardized derivatives will be required to trade on open platforms
and be submitted for clearing to central counterparties. The Commission
looks forward to implementing the Dodd-Frank bill to lower risk, promote
transparency and protect the American public.82

As discussed above, these provisions divide regulatory authority between the
SEC and CFTC.83 The SEC has authority over security-based swaps and the CFTC
has authority over all other swaps.84 Both the SEC and CFTC have jurisdiction over
mixed swaps, but neither has issued rules exercising this jurisdiction, most notably in
regard to the legality of pre-dispute arbitration clauses.85
Prior to the financial crisis, market participants responded to the lack of regulation
and the risks surrounding OTC derivatives by establishing various private governance
models.86 One such response was to found the ISDA, which is composed of 800
member institutions from sixty-seven countries87 and is the worldwide leader in
80. See Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, The Value of Derivatives 6 (2014), available at https://

www2.isda.org/attachment/NjQ3Mw==/ISDA%20FINAL%202014.pdf.

81.

See generally Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

82. Dodd-Frank Act, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, http://www.cftc.gov/lawregulation/

doddfrankact/index.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).

83. The joint rulemaking authority granted to the SEC and CFTC by Dodd-Frank was largely in response to

conflicting views on how to harmonize these two agencies. The George W. Bush administration proposed
to merge the regulatory philosophies of the two agencies, with the CFTC’s principles-based approach
overriding the SEC’s rules-based approach. See Dep’t of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized
Financial Regulatory Structure (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf. Conversely, the Barack Obama administration’s policy insisted
that the Commissions maintain their current market regulator roles, but also that the regulatory
frameworks for futures and securities be harmonized. Lamson & Allen, supra note 30, at 497.

84. Dodd-Frank § 2(a)(1).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., About ISDA, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, http://www2.isda.org/about-isda (last visited

Apr. 25, 2015).

87.

Id.

“These members include a broad range of OTC derivatives market participants including
corporations, investment managers, government and supranational entities, insurance
companies, energy and commodities firms, and international and regional banks. In
addition to market participants, members also include key components of the derivatives
market infrastructure including exchanges, clearinghouses and repositories, as well as law
firms, accounting firms and other service providers.”
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advancing “the understanding and treatment of derivatives as a risk management
tool.”88 The ISDA is the primary trade and lobbying group for the international
derivatives industry, and supplies standard form contracts that are used in many
derivative transactions.89 The Guide published by the ISDA in 2013 included a range
of model clauses for various forms of arbitration for use in OTC derivative transactions.90
These clauses complement the standard form contracts and provide the counterparties
with the flexibility needed in structuring a complex OTC swap deal.91
Publication of the Guide indicates that firms have a strong preference for arbitration
in resolving disputes in the derivatives market.92 Indeed, this is consistent with the
desire of firms dealing on the exchange-traded side to implement arbitration clauses as
well.93 The Guide’s model arbitration clauses “reflect the comments of members and
interested stakeholders” and represent an increasing use of arbitration in disputes over
OTC derivative transactions.94 This expansion is largely due to the “ease of enforcing
an arbitral award” as opposed to a court judgment in an international setting.95
Although the model clauses in the Guide are tailored to the needs of specific
members, each clause contains a standard provision requiring arbitration in the event
of a dispute. Specifically, each clause contains the following language:
Any dispute, claim, difference or controversy arising out of, relating to or
having any connection with this Agreement, including any dispute as to its
existence, validity, interpretation, performance, breach or termination or the
consequences of its nullity and any dispute relating to any non-contractual
obligations arising out of or in connection with it (a “Dispute”), shall be referred
to and finally resolved by arbitration.96

Id. Three types of ISDA membership exist. A “primary member” is an “investment, merchant or
commercial bank or other corporation, partnership or other business organization that deals in derivatives
as part of its business.” Member Types, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, http://www2.isda.org/
membership/member-types (last visited Apr. 25, 2015). An “associate membership” is “[d]esigned for
service providers . . . who are active in the privately negotiated derivatives business.” Id. A “subscriber
membership” is “[f]or corporations, financial institutions and government entities and others who use
privately negotiated derivatives to better manager financial risks.” Id.
88. See About ISDA, supra note 86.
89. David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy,

112 Colum. L. Rev. 152, 185 n.142 (2012).

90. See 2013 ISDA Arbitration Guide, supra note 22.
91.

ISDA Drafts Model Arbitration Clauses for Use with Master Agreements, Allen & Overy (2013) [hereinafter
Allen & Overy], available at http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/ISDA-draftsmodel-arbitration-clauses-for-use-with-master-agreements.aspx.

92.

See 2013 ISDA Arbitration Guide, supra note 22, at 4.

93.

Id.

94. Id. at i.
95. Allen & Overy, supra note 91.
96. 2013 ISDA Arbitration Guide, supra note 22, at apps. A–G.
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The member feedback that these provisions were drafted in response to “showed
little appetite” for more complex alternatives, such as optional arbitration clauses
where a party could choose to litigate or arbitrate a dispute arising out of a derivative
transaction.97 Because these model clauses merely serve as guides, concerned parties
may freely tailor a provision to meet a specific transaction’s needs. Accordingly,
counterparties not constrained to the views expressed by the SEC and CFTC have
more leeway and bargaining freedom to structure their agreements as they please.
III.	PROBLEM: PUTTING SQUARE PEGS IN ROUND HOLES

From the discussion above, we can make two important observations. First,
investors’ needs change depending on whether they are an institution or a private
party. Institutional investors arguably have more equal bargaining power with firms
they are transacting with than smaller private investors do.98 This obviates the need
for blanket provisions prohibiting mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses, since
this is a point of negotiation for which they can effectively bargain. The CFTC’s
carve out allowing institutional investors to waive their right to bring private claims
is likely an example of this, since institutional investors are better positioned to make
an informed decision about whether to waive their right to litigation.99 In this vein,
perhaps the SEC’s reluctance to issue rules in a timely fashion is also a nod to the
complexities associated with the wide range of customers investing in securitiesbased products.100
Second, parties’ attitudes toward arbitration change depending on the type of
derivative in question. On the one hand, the investing public disdains mandatory
arbitration when dealing in securities or securities-based derivatives.101 On the other
hand, when examining ISDA members’ feedback, it seems that investors of OTC
swaps dealing internationally prefer arbitration to litigation since different risks are
associated with these transactions.102 Hampering the ability to exercise this preference
could put a chilling effect on the OTC derivatives market, which contradicts DoddFrank’s policy of creating a functional regulatory scheme.103
Together, these two observations raise the question: For those corners of the
derivatives market in which mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses are left
unregulated, what should be done to properly address the competing forces at play?
More importantly, how should the Commissions use their rulemaking authority to
97.

Allen & Overy, supra note 91.

98. See BATNA discussion infra Part III.B.
99. See generally Winship, supra note 73.
100. See generally Lynch, supra note 20.
101. See discussion supra Part I.
102. See discussion supra Part I. Specifically, international financial transactions are subject to a heightened

level of enforcement risk not seen in local transactions. For a full discussion on ways to mitigate this
enforcement risk, see 2013 ISDA Arbitration Guide, supra note 22, § 2.

103. See Lamson & Allen, supra note 30, at 498.
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address this issue in the context of mixed OTC swaps? The bargaining power
individual investors possess in transacting with large firms is certainly disconcerting.
At the same time, however, blanket provisions will stymie competition and negotiation
within the markets, which could just as easily lead to similarly adverse results. Where,
then, do those tasked with regulating mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
OTC swap transactions draw their lines? A better understanding of the types of swaps
available to investors will shed light on potential answers to these questions.
A. Defining the Issue: What Is a Swap?

The SEC and CFTC have issued joint final rules that, among other things, add
clarity to the definition of “swap” under the CEA and “security-based swap” under
the Exchange Act.104 Section 721 of Dodd-Frank amended the CEA and the
Exchange Act to provide two definitions distinguishing the terms swap, securitybased swap, mixed swap, and non-security-based swaps.105 As amended, the CEA
broadly defines a “swap” as:
[A]ny agreement . . . that provides on an executory basis for the exchange . . .
of 1 or more payments based on the value or level of 1 or more . . . rates,
currencies, commodities, securities, instruments of indebtedness, indices,
quantitative measures, or other financial or economic interests or property of
any kind . . . and that transfers, as between the parties to the transaction, in
whole or in part, the financial risk associated with a future change in any
such value or level without also conveying a current or future direct or indirect
ownership interest in an asset (including any enterprise or investment pool) or
liability that incorporates the financial risk so transferred.106

This definition is subject to various exclusions.107 The Commissions make clear that
classifying a financial product as a swap or security-based swap (which the Commissions
refer to as “Title VII instruments”) is determined based on the underlying index or rate
on which that product is based.108 Title VII instruments based on interest or other
monetary rates are considered swaps, whereas those based on the yield of value of a
security, loan, or narrow-based security index are considered security-based swaps.109
104. See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”;

Mixed-Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 17 Fed. Reg. 48,207 (Aug. 13, 2012)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230, 240, and 241 (2014)).

105. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 721, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)

(2013)).

106. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(iii).
107. These exclusions include, among other things, forward contracts, foreign exchange forwards, and

foreign exchange swaps. See generally id. § 1a.

108. Id.
109. Id. The CEA and Exchange Act generally define a “narrow-based security index” as an index with nine

or fewer component securities. Other instances exist, however, in which an index may qualify as a
narrow-based security index. See id. § 1a(35).
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The Commissions define a “mixed swap” as a contract that is a security-based
swap and based on either: (1) an underlying reference other than a single security or
narrow-based security index, such as an interest rate or other monetary rate, currency,
commodity, etc.; or (2) the occurrence of an event associated with a potential
financial, economic, or commercial consequence other than an event relating to an
issuer of a security or the issuers in a narrow-based security index.110
Although these definitions appear to be relatively straightforward, “[c]haracterizing
a particular instrument as a swap, security-based swap, mixed swap or an instrument
that is exempt from swap regulation is a complicated matter and is the subject of a 585page joint release” issued by the Commissions.111 Despite the apparent difficulty in
drawing distinct lines between the various types of OTC transactions, these definitions
allow us to distill two additional takeaways. First, we know which agency has
jurisdiction over each category of OTC swap transaction. As mentioned above, the
SEC has jurisdiction over security-based swaps and the CFTC has jurisdiction over all
transactions that are not security-based swaps, but are instead simply categorized as
swaps.112 The Commissions share jurisdiction over mixed swaps, but have yet to
exercise this shared authority.113
Second, we know each respective agency’s current attitude toward the use of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses. The SEC possesses the authority to ban
the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses under Dodd-Frank in all
derivative transactions within the purview of its jurisdiction, but has not yet done so.
The CFTC and NFA, however, take the position that a valid, non-coerced predispute mandatory arbitration clause is binding if signed by the investor. Signing a
pre-dispute arbitration clause, however, cannot be mandatory.
If the SEC chooses to exercise its power under Dodd-Frank and enact a blanket
prohibition on the use of these clauses, it will create an inconsistency with the CFTC
approach.114 This will not only produce uncertainty for firms dealing in OTC swaps,
but will also erect haphazard boundaries between the various categories of swaps
that do not accurately ref lect the practicalities and economic substance of each
contract. It is to these problems that this note now turns.
B. The Power Distribution in an OTC Swap Transaction

The jurisdictional divide between the SEC and CFTC does not ref lect the
categorical differences between OTC swaps and exchange-traded derivatives. “OTC
110. See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”;

Mixed-Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 17 Fed. Reg. 48,210 (Aug. 13, 2012)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230, 240, and 241 (2014)).

111. Davis Polk, An Asset Manager’s Guide to Swap Trading in the New Regulatory World 3

(2013), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/An_Asset_Managers_Guide_to_Swap_
Trading.pdf.

112. See discussion supra Part II.A.
113. See discussion supra Part II.A.
114. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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swaps” are defined as “customized, bilateral agreements that transfer risk from one
party to another.”115 An OTC deal takes place between two private parties.116 Instead
of utilizing a centralized trading mechanism, “buyers and sellers negotiate terms
privately, often in ignorance of the prices currently available from other potential
counterparties and with limited knowledge of trades recently negotiated elsewhere in
the market.”117 Generally, broker-dealers forward orders to their own derivatives
desks and to other derivatives dealers if required, after which the two parties trade
based on a customized agreement.118
In contrast, “exchange-traded derivatives” are categorically defined as listed
derivatives that “are executed over a centralized trading venue . . . and then booked
with a central counterparty known as a clearing house.”119 Orders are originated and
collected by broker-dealers from their customers and then forwarded to exchanges
for execution.120 The “[t]rading parties usually remain anonymous”121 and the faceto-face negotiating element of the transaction is therefore eliminated.
These two categories present divergent challenges and opportunities for a
transaction’s counterparties. The extent of this disparity is ref lected in each
counterparty’s bargaining position which, in turn, impacts each party’s ability to
effectively negotiate favorable terms. Accordingly, the need for regulation governing
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in a respective derivative transaction will
differ depending on which economic category the transaction falls into.
For example, the terms of an exchange-traded contract, “including delivery places
and dates, volume, technical specifications, and trading and credit procedures,” are
completely standardized for each type of financial product being sold.122 For OTC
swaps, all of these terms are negotiable.123 If the standardized exchange-traded
contract contains a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause, the investor is limited
to one of two rigid choices: (1) sign the contract or (2) walk away. Conversely,
assuming all else remains equal, an investor negotiating an OTC swap transaction
has greater power to argue for favorable terms. If a party does not agree to the
inclusion of a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause, he has room to bargain for
different terms before deciding to walk away.
115. See ISDA FAQ , supra note 20.
116. See Darrell Duffie, Dark Markets: Asset Pricing and Information Transmission in Over-

the-Counter Markets 1 (2012).

117. Id. But see discussion infra Part IV.A.
118. See Deutsche Börse Group, The Global Derivatives Market: An Introduction 17 (2008)

[hereinafter Derivatives Market Intro], available at http://www.math.nyu.edu/faculty/avellane/
global_derivatives_market.pdf.

119. See ISDA FAQ , supra note 20.
120. R. Madhumathi, Derivatives and Risk Management 48 (2012).
121. Id.
122. See ISDA FAQ , supra note 20.
123. See Duffie, supra note 116.
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Bargaining flexibility also depends on the power dynamic at play in a given
transaction.124 “Given the situational nature of power, one should not be surprised to
find that it flows from an almost infinite set of sources.”125 In their article entitled
When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, Professors
Robert S. Adler and Elliot M. Silverstein showcase various overlapping sources of
power at play in a given transaction.126 Of these power sources, the existence of
“organizational power” is most important in the context of an OTC swap transaction
given the market’s polarized distribution of investor “sizes.” “Organizations produce
and enhance power for fairly obvious reasons. They provide financial and human
resources that vastly exceed those that can be mustered by isolated individuals.”127 In an
OTC transaction, then, the distribution of organizational power will depend on the
type and size of a given investor. One useful way to analyze this interplay is to examine
the breakdown of OTC swap customers by their underlying asset class which, as
discussed above, bears on the categorical definition provided by the Commissions.128 A
recent study published by the Deutsche Börse Group129 presents such a classification,
and can be summarized as follows:

Customer Type

Underlying Asset Class
Fixedincome

Foreign
Exchange

Credit

Equity

Commodities

Fundlinked

Public Sector/
Other

6%

12%

6%

3%

6%

1%

High Net Worth
Individuals

10%

13%

4%

33%

4%

59%

Corporates

31%

36%

6%

12%

70%

3%

Financial
Institutions

53%

39%

84%

52%

20%

37%

Although the exact classification will fluctuate depending on the revenue reported
by each OTC derivatives dealer in a given year, these statistics show that the
proportionate distribution of investor categories in the OTC market largely depends on
124. Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power Differentials in

Negotiations, 5 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2000).

125. Id.
126. Id. at 23. These categories in include: (1) personal power; (2) organizational power; (3) informational

power; and (4) moral power. Id.

127. Id. at 24–25.
128. See discussion supra Part II.A.
129. “Deutsche Börse Group is one of the largest exchange organisations worldwide. It organises markets

characterised by integrity, transparency and safety for investors . . . .” Deutsche Börse Group—Company
Profile, Deutsche Börse Group, http://deutsche-boerse.com/dbg/dispatch/en/kir/dbg_nav/about_
us/10_Deutsche_Boerse_Group (last visited Apr. 25, 2013). These research findings were published in
a white paper entitled “The Global Derivatives Market: An Introduction.” See generally Derivatives
Market Intro, supra note 118.
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the underlying asset class of the financial product in question. For example, we know
that in the representative year above, the majority of corporate customers invested in
commodities-based OTC swaps. We also know that commodity-based swaps fall
within the CFTC’s jurisdiction and that the NFA generally considers coerced
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses unenforceable when used in exchange-traded
transactions. On the one hand, the CFTC and NFA’s position that mandatory predispute arbitration clauses are generally unenforceable would lead to unnecessary
overregulation for the majority of customers—the corporate customers—in this
sample.130 Corporate customers, when compared to individual investors, possess more
organizational power when negotiating with an OTC dealer in this context.
Accordingly, regulating them would be much less needed. Indeed, to the extent that an
arbitration provision could ever be characterized as “mandatory” in this situation, the
customer would arguably be in a better position to advocate for more favorable terms in
other aspects of the agreement. On the other hand, if the CFTC and NFA were to
leave mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses completely unregulated for commoditybased OTC swaps, then the four percent of individual investors who possess less
organizational power—and are therefore more prone to harm—would be left vulnerable
and unprotected. This same logic could be applied to those OTC transactions falling
within the purview of the SEC’s jurisdiction, such as transactions between dealers and
the various customers for equity-based OTC swaps.
Of course, the ability to negotiate the terms of a transaction does not stem solely
from the availability of flexible provisions or the distribution of organizational power
in a respective agreement. Negotiating power can also be derived from the
interdependence between the counterparties and the availability of alternatives to the
transaction at issue.131 Interdependency and the availability of alternatives therefore
play different roles in an exchange-traded transaction and an OTC swap transaction.
“In most relationships, power f lows from the more dependent to the less
dependent party.”132 Although calculating specific levels of dependency is troublesome
without knowing the specifics of a given OTC swap negotiation, dependency is
certainly a function of the availability of alternatives. The concept commonly referred
to as “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement” (BATNA) suggests that “[i]f one
has a number of attractive alternatives to a deal with one’s opponent, one has great
power regardless of the tremendous resources that the other side might have within
its control.”133 Thus, if a party has more alternatives to choose from, that party is less
130. If a corporate customer fell within the “institutional investor” carve out, then the customer may be able

to waive its right to bring private litigation. See supra Part II.C.2.

131. Adler & Silverstein, supra note 124, at 19–20.
132. Id. at 19.
133. Id. at 20. “Negotiation theory assumes that settlements and agreements are consensual. Each party to a

negotiation is free to walk away from the bargaining table without a deal. Each party is assumed to have
alternatives that can be pursued without the agreement of the other negotiator.” Alex J. Hurder, The
Lawyer’s Dilemma: To Be or Not to Be a Problem-Solving Negotiator, 14 Clinical L. Rev. 253, 268 (2007).
Some legal scholars suggest that possessing greater power does not guarantee a successful bargaining
outcome. “Disproportionately greater power on the part of one party in a negotiation often reduces the
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dependent on its counterparty. If fewer alternatives are available, that party is more
dependent on its counterparty. Of course, a party’s negotiating power will further
depend on the quality of these alternatives as they relate to that party’s goals and
interests.134 Accordingly, a wholesale ban on pre-dispute arbitration clauses would
lead to significant over-regulation, since those larger investors with more alternatives
and less dependency would no longer have the ability to informatively waive their
right to litigation.
As we know, “[t]he derivatives market is highly competitive.”135 A tenet of modern
economics is that in a competitive market, consumers have a large number of
options.136 In the financial markets, a glut of available products stemming from this
competition provides market participants with options between three general
categories of alternatives: “(a) choice between OTC dealers within the OTC segment,
(b) choice between the OTC and on-exchange segments for many contract types, and
(c) choice between different derivatives exchanges.”137 Within the first category,
investors have a host of different OTC swap dealers to pick from. In fact, the list of
provisionally registered swap dealers is continually expanding.138 Within the third
category, investors can choose between roughly twenty-five major exchanges.139 While
the availability of these exchanges hinges on the type of financial product in question,
investors are by no means limited solely to one opportunity to invest their money.
Instead, investors have a plethora of options that, according to BATNA, further
decrease any dependency that may have existed, therefore increasing their negotiating
power—independent of each investor’s organizational power.
But that is just the tip of the iceberg; the availability of alternatives can be
multiplied further. Because some OTC swaps and exchange-traded alternatives
achieve the same economic purpose, alternatives available to derivative traders
percolate.140 Coupling the categorical choices available to an investor with the
likelihood of a favorable outcome for the powerful party, producing what Professor William Ury calls
the ‘power paradox’: ‘the harder you make it for them to say no, the harder you make it for them to say
yes.’” Adler & Silverstein, supra note 124, at 16–17.
134. Investors purchase derivatives for a variety of reasons. For ease of analysis, this note assumes that

derivatives are purchased to maximize return.

135. Derivatives Market Intro, supra note 118, at 19.
136. Eric A. Nilsson, Capitalism: Power, Profits, and Human Flourishing 208 (2004).
137. Derivatives Market Intro, supra note 118, at 21.
138. Dodd-Frank Act: Provisionally Registered Swap Dealers, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,

http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/registerswapdealer (last visited Apr. 25, 2013).

139. See All Futures Markets, Barchart, http://www.barchart.com/futures/all_futures.php (last visited Apr.

25, 2015) (listing all commodities sorted by exchange).

140. See Derivatives Market Intro, supra note 118, at 21. The following examples illustrate this point:

[B]oth an interest rate swap with a maturity of five years—a classic OTC product—and
an exchange-traded future on a five-year government bond offer protection against
interest rate changes over a time horizon of five years.
Similarly, OTC derivatives dealers offer forward transactions on any equity index for
all maturities that users could request. Derivatives exchanges offer futures (the
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possibility of achieving the same economic outcome through different investment
vehicles paints a seemingly endless canvas of choices. With the above logic, limitless
choices virtually eliminate each party’s dependency, and reduced dependency
substantially increases both parties’ bargaining power. The more bargaining power a
party possesses, the more “fair” a transaction becomes, which mitigates the need for
a negotiation to be regulated in the first place.
The arbitration problems associated with the split jurisdiction between the
Commissions reach their apex when a firm trading in OTC swaps is registered with
both Commissions’ SROs: the NFA and FINRA.141 The NFA requires all disputes
involving commodity futures contracts between a customer and a registrant to be
arbitrated with the NFA.142 Similarly, an investor must arbitrate with FINRA if the
dispute is with a FINRA member.143 So then, where do disputes arising out of mixed
OTC swap transactions (within the jurisdictional purview of both the SEC and
CFTC) involving firms registered with both the NFA and FINRA get arbitrated?
Dodd-Frank requires the Commissions to jointly prescribe regulations regarding
mixed swaps, but such action has yet to be taken.144 Recently, the CFTC issued a
release stating that under a proposed set of rules:
[B]ilateral, uncleared mixed swaps, where one of the counterparties is dually
registered as a dealer or major participant with both the CFTC and also with
the SEC, would be subject to certain key provisions of the CEA and related
CFTC rules as well as the requirements of the federal securities laws. For all
other mixed swaps, the Commissions are proposing a process where a person
who desires or intends to list, trade, or clear such a mixed swap (or class
thereof) can ask the agencies for a joint order . . . .145

Under this proposed regime, a dually-registered firm initiating a “take it or leave
it” approach to a pre-dispute arbitration provision in a bilateral, uncleared OTC
swap arrangement would still likely be bound by NFA arbitration rules since the
scope of those rules are determined by the definitions used in the CEA—such as

Id.

on-exchange equivalent of a forward transaction) on many equity indices as well—
although, only for a fixed set of maturity dates. Both products can be used for the same
purpose of obtaining exposure to the same underlying equity index.

141. Recall that firms trading in financial products within a Commission’s jurisdiction are required to

register as a member of that Commission’s SRO. See discussion supra Part I.

142. “(a) Mandatory Arbitration. . . . [T]he following disputes shall be arbitrated under this Code if the

dispute involves commodity futures contracts: (i) a dispute for which arbitration is sought by a customer
against a Member or employee thereof, or Associate, provided that: (A) the customer is not an FCM,
floor broker, Member or Associate . . . .” Code of Arbitration, supra note 16, § 2.

143. Arbitration Overview, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., https://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/

Arbitration/Overview/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).

144. Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed-

Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 17 Fed. Reg. 48,207, at 48,209 (Aug. 13,
2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230, 240, and 241 (2014)).

145. CFTC Q&A, supra note 35.
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“associate” or “Futures Commission Merchant.”146 For all other swaps, the Commissions
must work together in issuing a joint order resolving the jurisdictional boundaries in
play. Due to the divergent approaches taken by the Commissions regarding the
enforceability of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses, it is unclear what
compromise will emerge from the flames.
IV.	SOLUTION: LATHING THE PEGS

So far, this note has shown that the Commissions are currently bifurcated in
their approaches to regulating pre-dispute arbitration clauses in OTC swap
transactions. If the SEC chooses to exercise its rulemaking authority granted under
Dodd-Frank, it may limit or ban these clauses altogether. Anything other than a
mirror image of the CFTC approach will create an inconsistency. But such a tactic,
as this note has also demonstrated, does not accurately account for the actual needs
of the various customers investing in OTC swaps and does not reflect the economic
substance of these transactions. Rather than delineating clear, pragmatic, and
workable boundaries, the current regulatory scheme is plagued with arbitrary
distinctions that pigeonhole the Commissions into a no-win situation.147
In light of these shortcomings, this note proposes that the Commissions, with
assistance from the ISDA, implement a two-phase approach to regulating predispute arbitration clauses in OTC swap transactions. Phase One would involve,
through notice and comment rulemaking, a very limited approach by the
Commissions to issue regulations addressing the deficiencies discussed above. Phase
Two, in turn, would require the ISDA, as part of its Dodd-Frank Documentation
Initiative,148 to issue an updated Protocol encouraging market participants to adhere
to the Commissions’ new rules by supplementing the terms of existing swap
agreements in which counterparties have used the model arbitration clauses published
in the 2013 ISDA Arbitration Guide. Additionally, this phase would require the
ISDA to publish new model clauses to be used in conjunction with transactions
falling within the Commissions’ jurisdiction. The following two sections outline
these proposed phases.

146. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 1a (2013).
147. Other concerns, such as regulatory arbitrage—stemming from gaps in agency rules or inconsistencies

between agency approaches to regulation—exist but are beyond the purview of this note. Indeed, the
Commissions are aware of these risks and have acknowledged the need to reduce the potential for
regulatory arbitrage by publishing a notice asking if their two approaches are comparable or different,
and whether any difference is likely to impact market participants. See, e.g., End-User Exception to
Mandatory Clearing of Security-Based Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 34-63556 (Dec. 15, 2010).

148. “ISDA’s Dodd-Frank Documentation Initiative [is] aimed at assisting the industry in implementing and

complying with the regulatory requirements imposed under Title VII of [Dodd-Frank]. In order to
facilitate implementation of Dodd-Frank rulemakings, ISDA plans to launch future Protocols to
simplify documentation changes for upcoming CFTC and SEC final rules . . . .” ISDA March 2013 DF
Protocol, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n (2013), available at http://www2.isda.org/functionalareas/protocol-management/protocol/12.
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A. Phase One: Limited Regulation of Non-cleared OTC Swaps

Customers investing in OTC swaps range from individuals and small public
entities to large corporations and other financial institutions.149 As such, the negotiating
leverage at play in each of these transactions will depend on the various factors discussed
above. Those transactions most vulnerable to the risks associated with the “take it or
leave it” approach to pre-dispute arbitration involve a relatively powerless investor
privately negotiating with a large financial institution.150 But lawmakers recently passed
legislation that substantially diminishes this exposed vulnerability in face-to-face OTC
swap transactions. Beginning in 2012, the Commissions began requiring many types
of “swaps [that] have traditionally been entered into over the counter . . . to be cleared
through clearinghouses and traded on exchanges.”151 These clearinghouses serve as
transactional gatekeepers, thereby protecting customers from many of the negotiation
risks associated with non-cleared OTC swaps.152
As noted above, non-cleared OTC swap transactions are bilateral and are
typically executed in person or over the phone between the buyer and seller.153 By
requiring counterparties to an OTC swap transaction to clear through a central
counterparty, each participant knows exactly who maintains which positions.154 This
eliminates the need to protect an investor against any imbalance—perceived or
otherwise—in the power distribution when negotiating with a large financial
institution. Moreover, by requiring a central counterparty, a market participant no
longer has “to face a counterparty that ha[s] the necessary balance sheet and credit to
be able to stand behind a trade.”155 Nathan Jenner, the chief operating officer of
149. See Derivatives Market Intro, supra note 118, at 9.
150. See BATNA discussion supra Part III.B.
151. Swap, Practical L., http://us.practicallaw.com/0-382-3858?q=Swap+definition (last visited Apr. 25,

2015) (emphasis omitted). The phase-in schedule was proposed as follows:
Category 1
Category 2
Category 3

Swap Dealers, Major Swap Participants, and Active
March 11, 2013
Funds
Commodity Pools, Hedge Funds, and Non-Swap
June 10, 2013
Dealer Banks
All Other Entities Required to Clear

September 9, 2013

CFTC Announces That Mandatory Clearing Begins Today, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n
(Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6529-13; CFTC Announces That
Mandatory Clearing for Category 2 Entities Begins Today, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n
(June 10, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6607-13; CFTC Announces That the
Third Phase of Mandatory Clearing of Certain Credit Default Swaps and Interest Rate Swaps Begins Today,
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr668413 (last updated Sept. 9, 2013).
152. See generally Summary of the Dodd-Frank Act: Swaps and Derivatives, Practical L. (2013), http://

us.practicallaw.com/resource/3-502-8950.

153. See BATNA discussion supra Part III.B.
154. See Evolution of the OTC Swaps Market, Bloomberg (2013), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/

professional/content/uploads/sites/2/2013/07/54104667-fi-us-garp-wnar-idoc.pdf.

155. Id.
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Fixed Income E-Trading at Bloomberg, posits that this type of situation essentially
leads to the equalization of credit:
The credit facing a big bank like Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan or Bank of
America arguably will no longer be different than the credit facing a much
smaller bank, or potentially even a hedge fund, and that’s because all parties of
the transaction will be giving up their trade to face a central clearing venue.156

It stands to reason that by equalizing credit between a small bank and a large
institution, as Jenner suggests, the small bank retains more organizational power
compared to the big bank. With more organizational power, less protection is needed.
Accordingly, it makes sense that the new clearing requirements obviate the need to
limit or ban the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in those swap
agreements subject to mandatory clearing. By mitigating the concerns that gave rise
to the uproar against these clauses in the first place, the new mandatory clearing
rules render other regulatory initiatives—such as the proposed Investor Choice Act
of 2013—superfluous.
For those OTC swaps that are excluded from the clearing requirements,157 the
Commissions should tread lightly in enacting legislation and should limit their
rulemaking to non-cleared OTC swaps. Any proposed rule should adopt a more
prescriptive-based approach taking into consideration the actual bargaining power at
play in the transaction. The Commissions must acknowledge the size of each
counterparty, the availability of options, and take extreme caution to not draw
arbitrary lines based on the classification of the underlying asset for the derivative in
question. By taking a balanced approach to limiting mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses, the Commissions will promote the conflicting policy goals that
Congress has struggled with since before it enacted Dodd-Frank: promoting
uniformity in rulemaking and maintaining a functional regulatory split between the

156. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Fixed-to-floating swaps, basis swaps, forward rate agreements, and overnight index swaps are excluded

from clearing if they include optionality, dual currencies, or conditional notional amounts. The term
“conditional notional amount” is defined as notional amounts that can change over the life of a swap
“based on a condition established by the parties upon execution such that the notional amount of the swap
is not a known number or schedule of numbers, but may change based on the occurrence of some future
event.” Susan Milligan, OTC Interest Rate Swaps: Mandatory Clearing Summarized 5 (Dec.
7, 2012), available at http://www.swapclear.com/Images/lch_cftcdetermbriefing_09_tcm14-62734.pdf.
Swaptions and extendable swaps are also excluded:
The clearing requirement does not apply to swaps created after the commencement of
mandatory clearing by the exercise or expiry of swaptions entered prior to the commencement
of mandatory clearing. The [CFTC] states that the clearing requirement only applies to
swaps resulting from the exercise of a swaption or extendible swap extension if the clearing
requirement would have been applicable to the underlying swap or the extended swap at the
time the counterparties executed the swaption or extendible swap.

Id. As of June 30, 2013, the value of non-cleared derivatives within the derivative market was said to be
$79 trillion. See Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, The Value of Derivatives (2014), available at
https://www2.isda.org/attachment/NjQ3Mw==/ISDA%20FINAL%202014.pdf.
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SEC and CFTC.158 This will, in turn, mitigate the chance of over-regulation and
lessen the possibility of chilling an otherwise competitive market.
Moreover, once the Commissions have sufficiently untangled the jurisdictional
knot surrounding mixed swaps, they must clearly delineate which types of OTC
swaps are subject to FINRA’s arbitration rules and which are subject to the NFA
arbitration rules. In situations where the counterparty is a member of both FINRA
and the NFA, and depending on the precise language of the arbitration provision in
play, a counterparty to a mixed swap transaction may have the choice between
FINRA and NFA arbitration.159 The differences between these two arbitration
forums,160 and the apparent regulatory gap in this context, gives rise to the danger of
regulatory arbitrage.161 By enacting clearly defined rules, the Commissions will
further another congressional goal by drafting Dodd-Frank’s joint rulemaking
provisions—preventing such arbitrage opportunities.162
158. Lamson & Allen, supra note 30, at 499.
159. In response to any potential deficiencies, many interested constituents have already begun to consider

ways to improve the current SRO arbitration system. These improvements, when implemented, will
effectively diminish the concerns fueling the move toward an outright ban on mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses. For a full discussion on the pros and cons of SRO arbitration, see William B.L.
Little, Fairness Is in the Eyes of the Beholder, 60 Baylor L. Rev. 73 (2008) (“Arbitration can be a fair,
efficient forum for the resolution of commercial disputes. Unfortunately, there exists a significant
perception that SRO [] arbitration as currently structured is not impartial or economical.”).

160. The differences between these two forums, and the rules governing each, are beyond the scope of this

note. However, in his book Investor’s Guide to Loss Recovery: Rights, Mediation, Arbitration, and Other
Strategies, securities fraud expert Louis L. Straney elaborates on one key difference:
There’s a big difference between securities and commodities or futures cases. There is a
two-year statute of limitations beginning when you knew, or should have known; where
either you get to know, or you should have known; when the course of action arises. So,
to simplify, you have to file your case within two years of knowing when you had a case.
Some Futures Commission Merchants (FCMs) shorten that statute of limitations to
one year. That is upheld by arbitration before the National Futures Association (NFA),
but not by the reparations administration law judges. If you contrast that to securities,
where you sign a customer agreement and are designated to resolve a dispute before
FINRA, there’s a six-year eligibility rule that applies. So, you really have six years to
bring your case before FINRA. . . . The two different industries are quite distinct.

See Louis L. Straney, Investor’s Guide to Loss Recovery: Rights, Mediation, Arbitration,
and Other Strategies (2011) (footnotes omitted).
161. “Congress appears to have recognized that different products and markets can serve as economic substitutes

and that if the agencies adopt rules that leave gaps or are inconsistent, there is a danger of regulatory
arbitrage by exploitation of these gaps and inconsistencies.” Lamson & Allen, supra note 30, at 499.

162. Mr. Lamson and Ms. Allen pose an interesting question in response to Congress requiring the

Commissions to engage in joint rulemaking:

Id.

“On the other hand, by not requiring uniform rulemaking, Congress seems to have
empowered the agencies to permit such arbitrage opportunities. Does joint rulemaking
in its present form prevent arbitrage and encourage the SEC and CFTC to implement
a policy of increased regulation in a previously unregulated area or is it a subterfuge to
allow the markets to pick their own regulator or avoid regulation altogether?”
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B. Phase Two: ISDA Protocol

Although many OTC markets have already seen a movement toward
standardization, “a large swath of the market is still going to need to customize and
tailor their OTC derivative instruments.”163 The ISDA has already taken steps
toward achieving standardization by publishing a suite of documents for use in OTC
swap transactions.164 The foundational documents published by the ISDA include
the 1992 and 2002 ISDA Master Agreements, which establish “the global market
standard” and “the contractual framework” for an OTC swap transaction.165 These
agreements comprise “a standard printed form, which sets out the principal clauses in
detail[]” such that parties may tailor their bargain based on specific requirements.166
Additionally, the ISDA published the Guide in 2013, providing general guidance on
arbitration to ISDA members and a range of model arbitration clauses to be used in
conjunction with the 1992 and 2002 Master Agreements.167 Similarly, from time to
time, the ISDA issues protocols to address contractual and legal issues that arise,
providing “an efficient way of implementing industry standard contractual changes
over a broad number of counterparties.”168 This is in connection with the DoddFrank Documentation Initiative, which seeks to simplify documentation changes for
finalized SEC and CFTC rules.169 The last protocol closed on September 17, 2014,170
163. Evolution of the OTC Swaps Market, supra note 154.
164. The scope of the ISDA’s activities are summarized as follows:

Starting in the late 1980s, the scope of [the] ISDA’s activities began to expand beyond
just documentation. [The] ISDA became involved in discussions with regulators on
behalf of the OTC derivatives industry. [The] ISDA board members and representatives
now regularly testify before congressional committees. [The] ISDA has played a key
role in keeping the OTC derivatives industry self-regulated. It has coordinated industry
opposition to CFTC and SEC regulation, acting both as an advocate for the industry
and as an instrument for its self-regulation. [The] ISDA has also lobbied successfully to
get legislation passed in the U.S. explicitly recognizing the validity of netting agreements
for derivatives contracts in bankruptcy contexts.

Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, 6 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 211, 246–47 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
165. See Allen & Overy, ISDA Publishes Model Arbitration Clauses for Master Agreements

(2013), available at http://www2.isda.org/attachment/NTg0Mg==/ISDA%20publishes%20model%20
arbitration%20clauses%20for%20Master%20Agreements.pdf.

166. Id.
167. Id. “Although the governing law of the Master Agreement remains either English law or New York law,

the model clauses provide a much greater variety of arbitral forums than the traditional choice between
English and New York courts.” Id.

168. About ISDA Protocols, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/

protocol-management/about-isda-protocols/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).

169. See Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, ISDA Dodd-Frank Documentation Initiative and

August 2012 Dodd-Frank Protocol FAQ 1 (Aug. 13, 2012), available at http://www2.isda.org/
attachment/NDcxMA==/DFDI%20and%20Protocol%20FAQ%200813%202012.pdf.

170. Open Protocols, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-

management/open-protocols/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
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and the ISDA “plans to launch future Protocols to simplify documentation changes
for upcoming CFTC and SEC final rules” and facilitate industry compliance.171
Against this backdrop, the Commissions should coordinate with the ISDA to
publish a Protocol in response to the newly issued rules proposed in Phase One. This
Protocol would seek to ensure compliance with the rules, while providing susceptible
investors with the necessary information needed to decide whether to waive their right
to litigation for disputes arising from non-cleared OTC swap transactions. Then,
either by amending the Guide or publishing a U.S.-specific guide, the ISDA should
provide model arbitration clauses that comply with the Commissions’ newly enacted
rules. For example, a standardized model clause (mirroring language used in the
Guide) for a transaction falling under the CFTC’s jurisdiction could read as follows:
Arbitration
(i) Any dispute, claim, difference or controversy arising out of, relating to or
having any connection with this Agreement, including any dispute as to its
existence, validity, interpretation, performance, breach or termination or the
consequences of its nullity and any dispute relating to any non-contractual
obligations arising out of or in connection with it (a “Dispute”), shall be
referred to and finally resolved by arbitration.
(ii) The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the [National
Futures Association Arbitration Rules] (the “Rules”). Capitalised terms used
in this Section which are not otherwise defined in this Agreement have the
meaning given to them in the Rules.172

Although seemingly straightforward, such a clause would limit the pitfalls discussed
above, reducing noncompliance and mitigating uncertainty. Syndicating resources to
publish model clauses like this one will allow the Commissions and the ISDA to
shelter those investors who truly need protection, while maintaining the flexibility to
negotiate non-cleared OTC swap transactions.173 By standardizing model pre-dispute
171. ISDA August 2012 DF Protocol, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, available at http://www2.isda.org/

functional-areas/protocol-management/protocol/8 (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).

172. See 2013 ISDA Arbitration Guide, supra note 22.
173. Various governmental agencies have already begun to syndicate resources to achieve common goals in

other contexts. For example, to prevent employers from shifting workforces off the books by misclassifying
workers as independent contractors:
States have taken the lead in initiating reform efforts to combat independent contractor
misclassification and subcontracting abuses by making better use of agency resources to
document the problem and coordinate on enforcement and tightening up the rules to ensure
employers are held accountable for their employees. Almost half of the states now have a
task force or commission to document the problem and better direct enforcement efforts . . . .

Sarah Leberstein & Anastasia Christman, Occupy Our Occupations: Why “We Are the 99%” Resonates with
Working People and What We Can Do to Fix the American Workplace, 39 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1073, 1100 (2012).
In the context of financial reform, other scholars have also suggested a more “international framework” to
protecting U.S. investors. See, e.g., Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to
U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 Harv. Int’l L.J. 31 (2007). Moreover, the SEC has
already taken steps toward coordinating with international regulators in defining rules governing parties to
cross-border security-based swap transactions. See SEC Proposes Rules for Cross-Border Security-Based Swap
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arbitration clauses, counterparties will be encouraged to comply with the new rules
because they would be confident in the enforceability of the clauses, certain over
which arbitral forum will preside, and clear about which rules will apply to that forum.
Standardization will therefore facilitate the competitive nature of the OTC market
and allow counterparties to negotiate free of any fear that their bargained-for
agreements will not be enforced.
V. CONCLUSION

As it stands now, both approaches employed by the SEC and CFTC fail to
adequately or accurately regulate the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in OTC
swap transactions. By taking a hard look at the market activity and actual power
distributions at play in the OTC derivatives market, and scrutinizing the impact of
rules already issued under Dodd-Frank, the Commissions will be better positioned to
more precisely fill the void that currently exists in the regulatory scheme. A syndicated
approach will lessen the chance for superfluous, broadly sweeping regulation and will
instead provide sharpened clarity that will assist those customers in need of protection
to make informed investment decisions. Similarly, a harmonized approach to developing
more accurately polished laws will allow the OTC derivatives market to flourish by
facilitating even-keeled bargaining between market participants. With that in mind,
this note should not be read as a definitive solution to the problem. Instead, it merely
serves to expose the flaws in the current regulatory system and suggests one possible
approach to fixing those flaws. It is up to the regulators to sit down and hash out a
workable solution that has a practical and positive influence on the OTC swap market.

Activities, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 1, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/
Detail/PressRelease/1365171514072#.VME0qsass_s (“The proposal outlines a ‘substituted compliance’
framework in order to facilitate a well-functioning global security-based swap market.”).
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